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INTRODUCTION

As Felstiner, Abel and Sarat observed 35 years ago, the first step in the process of creating
a legal dispute²which is also to say, the first step in potentially claiming a right²is in managing
to name the category of harm in question. 1 Despite substantial developments in human rights law
and international criminal law over the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, however, our ability to
consistently, universally and adequately name large-scale rights violations according to a clear set
of criteria remains a matter of dispute. This is not only the case in some of the more dramatic and
apparent instances of widespread and systematic integrity rights violations, but also, and in a
potentially more troubling way, relative to many more mundane and constitutive components of the
legal and practical environments in which we all live.
This paper attempts to make progress towards the coherent naming of such large scale and
serious situations of violation. In doing so, it turns to the notion of crimes against humanity. This
will, to those familiar with the term, likely be surprising. As Norman Geras puts it at the beginning
of his book on crimes against humanity
What is a crime against humanity? In the literature about this, which has
accumulated during more than half a century, it has become commonplace that
the content and boundaries of the idea have been imprecise. They were so from
the very beginning. Hannah Arendt was reflecting a common view when she
wrote that the judges at Nuremberg had left the new crime in a µtantalizing state
J.S.D. Candidate, 2018, New York University School of Law; J.D., 2012, New York University School of Law.
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William Felstiner, Richard Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming,
Blaming, Claiming…, 15 LAW AND SOC. REV. 631, 635 (1981).
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of ambiguity¶. Its subsequent evolution, too, µhas not been orderly¶, as is not
altogether surprising for what began life as a concept in customary law. There is
a wide scholarly consensus about the resulting state of affairs. µWhile crimes
against humanity are clearly enshrined today in customary international law,¶ one
commentator has said, µtheir precise definition is not free of doubt¶. ¶The scope
of crimes against humanity¶, writes another, µis difficult to determine
precisely¶. Yet others speak of the term as µshrouded in ambiguity¶, its definition
as µnotoriously elusive¶, a situation of µchronic definitional confusion¶.2
³Crimes against humanity,´ in other words, is about as problematic a concept as possible
from which to launch an attempt to clarify the legal classification of situations of mass violation.
The first source of confusion lies in the double nature of the test required by the term. In the first
place, the existence of a situation of crimes against humanity must be shown; once that has been
established, individual liability for crimes may be pursued. Even when this is understood, however,
contestation over exactly how to understand situations of crimes against humanity, together with
uncertainty over the extent of harm necessary in order for a factual situation to rise to such a level,
further complicate the area. The caution in the manner in which the term is employed that is
engendered by such uncertainty is further magnified by the term¶s link to the criminal context, in
which defendants are rightly protected from overly quick condemnation, as well as by its link to the
International Criminal Court (ICC), which combines unique authority on such matters with
structural grounds for caution. Thus, it is no surprise that statements referring to situations of crimes
against humanity employ tentative language almost as a matter of course, as illustrated for instance
by a recent report by the United Nations (UN) on Eritrea, which stated that violations there ³may
constitute crimes against humanity´3²despite the fact that, on any plausible reading of the term, it
is abundantly clear that they do.
There are three reasons why this paper nonetheless begins with the term crimes against
humanity in its efforts to develop a clarified classificatory schema. In the first place, ³crimes against
humanity´ is simply the existing generalizable4 terminology applicable to at least a particular subset
of the worst instances of mass rights violation. Given the importance of maintaining a unified set

2
NORMAN GERAS, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: BIRTH OF A CONCEPT vii (2011) (citing Darryl Robinson,
Defining ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ at the Rome Conference, 93 AM. J. INT¶L L. 43, 44 (1999), Yoram Dinstein, Crimes
Against Humanity, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF KRZYSZTOF SKUBISZEWSKI 891, 896 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1996), Phyllis Hwang, Defining Crimes Against Humanity
in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 22 FORDHAM INT¶L L. J. 457, 487 (1998), Diane Orentlicher,
Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2585
(1991), Margaret deGuzman, The Road from Rome: The Developing Law of Crimes Against Humanity, 22 HUM. RTS.
Q. 335, 336 (2000), and Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence,
37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT¶L L. 787, 790-91 (1999)). A variety of overlapping factors²LQFOXGLQJ WKH WHUP¶V FRQWLQJHQW
development, its history of ties to war crimes, the link to criminality, a history of major world powers imposing one-sided
justice on the defeated and the potential necessity of international jurisdiction²could all be cited as factors that have
contributed to the convoluted and unclear nature and uneven application of the term.
3
5HSRIWKH&RPP¶Qof Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea, Human Rights Council, Twenty-Ninth Session,
¶ 66, U.N. Doc A/HRC/29/42 (June 4, 2015) (emphasis added). The cautious language in such instance is yet further overdetermined, of course, by the structural factors underpinning UN caution generally.
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of terminology, it is important that existing terminology be employed. 5 In the second place, the
crimes against humanity label carries with it an already clearly recognized hefty weight of
normative condemnation. Finally, despite the lack of clarity regarding situations of crimes against
humanity in the international criminal law realm, the term is still better defined than any comparable
term to have developed purely within human rights law. 6
The ambiguity of the concept of crimes against humanity means that a necessary first step
in the process of producing a clear definition of the term, as Geras has recognized, must be to
conduct a reconstruction of the term. Performing such a reconstruction is not a task that can be
accomplished in a vacuum or on the basis of formalist principles²rather, like all interpretation,
such a reconstruction can only be accomplished with reference to guiding principles, with greater
unity and clarity in such principles leading to greater unity and clarity of interpretation. This paper
proposes a ³victim-centered approach,´ described in further detail below, as the central guiding
principle in the light of which reconstruction should be performed.
Part two of this paper provides a historical account of the development of the concept of
crimes against humanity. While well-trodden ground for the initiated, this brief history provides
important context for those less familiar with the idea of crimes against humanity. The history,
moreover, helps to show certain ways in which the term has evolved over the course of its life that
may be taken as signs of the influence of a victim-centered approach on the term¶s evolution. Part
three of the paper introduces and discusses the victim-centered approach, attempting to lay to rest
some of the major critiques and concerns such an approach might raise. Parts four, five, and six
then perform the necessary reconstruction²emphasizing the importance of thinking about
situations of crimes against humanity in terms of responsible entities, situational parameters, and
levels of aggregate harm. Finally, part seven addresses the importance of naming in general, maps
out the parameters of the terrain surrounding situations of crimes against humanity, and suggests of
clearer categories in such areas.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

A key early articulation of the idea of crimes against humanity came through the Martens
Clause of the Fourth Hague Convention, which referred to the ³laws of humanity and the dictates
of public conscience.´7 Another key historical moment came with the 1915 declaration by Russia,
5

On the importance of unifying terms, see David Scheffer, Genocide and Atrocity Crimes, 1 GENOCIDE
STUD. & PREVENTION: AN INT¶L JOURNAL 229, 237 (2006); David Scheffer, The Merits of Unifying Terms: ‘Atrocity
Crimes’ and ‘Atrocity Law,¶GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION: AN INT¶L JOURNAL 91, 92 (2007).
6

The Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission include in the list of situations which merit
inclusion in Chapter IV.B of the Annual Report ± the Chapter reserved for the situations of greatest concern ± situations of
µPDVVLYHVHULRXVDQGZLGHVSUHDGYLRODWLRQVRIKXPDQULJKWV¶([DFWO\ZKLFKVLWXDWLRQVIDOOXQGHUWKDWODEHOLVQRWIXUWKHU
defined however. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2013 Rules of Procedure. The African Charter refers to
µVHULRXVRUPDVVLYHYLRODWLRQV¶EXWQRGHILQition is provided. African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, CAB/LEG/67/3
rev. 5 (1982; entry into force: Oct. 21, 1986), Art. 58(1).
7
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to the Convention Regulations
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, (Oct 18, 1907). The Clause appeared 8 years earlier in the preamble to
the Hague II Convention of 1899; and in the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of
Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight. See Lindsay Moir, Crimes Against Humanity in Historical Perspective,
3 N.Z. Y.B. INT¶L L. 101, 126-27 (2006). On the importance of the Martens Clause see Antonio Cassese, The Martens
Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?, 11 EUR. J. INT¶L L. 187 (2000). It has also been argued that slavery could be
understood as a crime against humanity from as early as 1841. See Leila S. Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg
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Britain and France that Turkey had committed crimes ³against humanity and civilization´ through
its actions against its Armenian population. 8 While the Treaty of Versailles did not include a
definition of crimes against humanity, but rather only of war crimes,9 a Commission formed to look
into responsibilities for acts during the war found that Germany and her allies had violated the
µdictates of humanity¶ and the µlaws of humanity¶, making them liable to criminal prosecution. 10
The 1920 Treaty of Sevres, signed with Turkey, explicitly envisioned prosecution of those
responsible for crimes against humanity, understood to encompass massacres of Armenians in
particular, but the treaty was never ratified and no tribunals were formed.11 Even though prosecution
of crimes against humanity was not being pursued in practice, the concept was beginning to take
shape.12
The need for an additional category to complement war crimes was recognized by the
United Nations War Crimes Commission during World War II.13 When Italy surrendered, the treaty
of surrender referred to prosecution of both war crimes and ³analogous offenses.´14 The key aim
was to prosecute not only war crimes, which were ³only a part of the whole ghastly Hitlerite
enterprise´, but rather for ³the entire enterprise to be included in the trial.´15 The point was that
³but for the fact that the victims were technically enemy [i.e. German, in the most part] nationals,
such persecutions were otherwise in every respect similar to war crimes´16²with motivation to
create such a category being provided by the fact that ³the suggestion that Nazi persecutors and
Principles by the French Court of Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT¶L L. 289,
296-97 (1994). Schabas agrees, and in fact traces the term back to Voltaire. See William Schabas, Why is There a Need for
a Crimes Against Humanity Convention?, 44 STUD. IN TRANSNAT¶L LEGAL POL¶Y 251, 261 (2012).
8

PARIS, EDITIONS INTERNATIONALES, LA DOCUMENTATION INTERNATIONALE: LA PAIX DE VERSAILLES,
VOL. 3, RESPONSIBILITIES DES AUTEURS DE LA GUERRE ET SANCTIONS, Annex I (1930). See also Leslie C. Green, Group
rights, war crimes and crimes against humanity, 1 INT¶L J. ON GROUP RTS.    VWDWLQJ³>D@OWKRXJKWKH
WULSDUWLWH GHFODUDWLRQ ZDV WKH ILUVW RFFDVLRQ LQ ZKLFK WKH WHUP µFULPHV DJDLQVW KXPDQLW\¶ DSSHDUHG LQ DQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO
instrument, there were numerous references to humanitarian intervention prior to this in the doctrine of international law.
None of these, however, suggested that there was a right to try as criminals those responsible for the acts which led to the
LQWHUYHQWLRQ´ 
9

Largely due to US skepticism as to the notion of crimes against humanity; see Memorandum of Reservations
Presented by the Representatives of the United States to the Report of the Commission on Responsibilities, Annex II, Apr.
4, 1919, reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT¶L L. 127 (1920).
10
See Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT¶L L. 178, 180-81 (1946) (providing an
RYHUYLHZRI,QWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPLVVLRQILQGLQJVWKDW*HUPDQ\DQGKHUDOOLHVKDGYLRODWHGWKH³ODZVRIKXPDQLW\´  see also
Lindsay Moir, Crimes Against Humanity in Historical Perspective, 3 N.Z. Y.B. INT¶L L.    ³7KHGLVWLQFWLRQ
made by the Commission between (a) the law and customs of war, and (b) the laws of humanity is fundamentally important,
and can be seen as reflecting the distinction between war crimes and crimes against humanity at NXUHPEHUJDQGEH\RQG´ 
11

E.g., Treaty of Peace Between the Allied Powers and Turkey, Aug 10, 1920, reprinted in 15 AM. J. INT¶L
L. 179, 235 (1921); Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT¶L L. 178, 182 (1946); David Matas,
Prosecuting Crimes Against Humanity: The Lessons of World War I, 13 FORDHAM INT¶L L. J. 86, 91 (1989).
12

Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT¶L L. 178, 181-83 (1946).

13

Id. at 184-85.

14

Id. at 185.

15

Lindsay Moir, Crimes Against Humanity in Historical Perspective, 3 N.Z. Y.B. INT¶L L. 101, 113 (2006)
(citing U.S. DEP'T OF ST., PUB. NO. 3080, REP. OF Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the International
Conference on Military Tribunals (1945, released 1949) [hereinafter Jackson Report]).
16

Id. (citing UN War Crimes Commission, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION
174 (1948)).
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exterminators had not violated the traditional rules of warfare was, however, µsimply impossible
for the battered peoples of Europe to accept in 1945.¶´17
The first definition of crimes against humanity was provided by the International Military
Tribunal in Nuremberg in 1945, which defined the term in article 6(c) as referring to
[m]urder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not
in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.18
As noted, the category of crimes against humanity had been perceived as necessary in
order to ensure that prosecutions might not only reach crimes against foreign populations, but also
crimes against a country¶s own citizens. The creation of the category was hence linked from the
beginning to the idea of human rights as a category of international law, that is, to the idea that
states have obligations not only to each other, but also to their own citizens.19 As one author has put
it,
[t]he crimes against humanity charge confirmed that citizens are under the
protection of international law even when they are victimized by their
compatriots. Furthermore, the criminality of such acts ³whether or not in
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated´ established the
supremacy of international law over municipal law. In this way, the prohibition
of crimes against humanity at Nuremberg had the potential to irretrievably pierce
the trope of sovereignty²´a rule of international law which provides that no state
shall intervene in the territorial and personal sphere of validity of another national
legal order.´20
It was hence perhaps in order to soften this dramatic expansion of international
responsibility that crimes against humanity in the Nuremberg context were ultimately defined as
fundamentally linked to war crimes and crimes against peace, or in connection with ³any crime

17

Id. at 109 (citing BRADLEY SMITH, REACHING JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG 14 (1977)).

18

Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Art.
6(c), Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 287-88. The definition at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East was
similar, though it did not refer to the religious grounds of discrimination and was explicit as to liability extending up and
down chains of command. On the nature of the underlying grounds in the Nuremberg definition, see Phyllis Hwang, Defining
Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 22 FORDHAM INT¶L L. J. 457, 462-3
(1998).
19

On the relation between the concepts see HERSH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 36 (1950); LOUIS HENKIN, RICHARD PUGH, OSCAR SCHACHTER & HANS SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 986 (2nd ed.
1987); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Proscribing Function of International Criminal Law in the Process of Protection of Human
Rights, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORDER 193 (1982).
20

Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT¶L L. 787, 791 (1999) (citing Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Art. 6(c), Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279-287-88 and Franz Schick, The Nuremberg Trial and the
International Law of the Future, 41 AM. J. INT¶L L. 770, 784-85 (1947)).
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within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,´ as article 6(c) puts it.21 In fact, Jackson argued for such a
definition in part due to his awareness that domestic patterns of racial discrimination in the United
States could otherwise come to be addressed as crimes against humanity. 22
One of the central legal debates around the idea of crimes against humanity at Nuremberg
concerned whether or not prosecutions under that notion would run afoul of the notion of nullum
crimen sine lege.23 Some, like Jackson, argued that the prohibition was not violated since the acts
in question were ³criminal by standards generally accepted in all civilized countries.´24 At the same
time it was hard to deny, as one commentator writing shortly thereafter put it, that international
prosecution under the notion of crimes against humanity ³must be considered a legal innovation of
the first magnitude.´25 Ultimately, the tribunal claimed that the prohibition of ex post facto laws
was not yet a matter of customary international law and hence the charges might stand, though a
major motivation was clearly that the importance of prosecuting crimes against humanity was seen
as greater than the importance of respecting such a principle. 26
Likely due to uncertainty as to the legitimacy of prosecutions for crimes against humanity,
the category was relied on in a generally supportive way at Nuremberg, with the tribunal cautious
in probing the boundaries²while it was willing to consider crimes against humanity committed
before the first of September 1939 in the course of considering broader patterns, no defendants were
convicted solely for crimes against humanity committed prior to September 1, 1939, and the tribunal
was in general reluctant to find that the nexus requirement had been met in such instances. 27 At the

21

M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 25 (2nd ed.
1999); Margaret deGuzman, Crimes Against Humanity, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
121, 121-22 (Nadia Bernaz & William Schabas eds., 2011); Lindsay Moir, Crimes Against Humanity in Historical
Perspective, 3 N.Z. Y.B. INT¶L L.101, 120-22 (2006); Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity:
Resolving the Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT¶L L. 787, 791-2 (1999); Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23
BRITISH Y.B. INT¶L L. 178, 205 (1946).
22

See William Schabas, Why Is There a Need for a Crimes Against Humanity Convention?, 44 STUD. IN
TRANSNAT¶L LEGAL POL¶Y 251, 262-  -DFNVRQ¶VVXSSRUWIRUWKHnexus formed part of a larger concern to preserve
the traditional notion of sovereignty. While Jackson was opposed by Groos from the French delegation, Jackson won out.
Even with the nexus requirement, however, the result was still a dramatic challenge to the traditional notion of sovereignty.
Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT¶L L.
787, 799-800 (1999) (citing Jackson Report, supra note 15, at 329, 331, 361).
23

See, e.g., BRADLEY F. SMITH, REACHING JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG 14 (1977); BASSIOUNI, supra note

21, at 18, 31.
24

Jackson Report, supra note 15, at 48. See also BASSIOUNI, supra note 21, at 41-42; BRADLEY F. SMITH,
REACHING JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG 15 (1977).
25

F.B. Schick, The Nuremberg Trial and the International Law of the Future, 41 AM. J. INT¶L L. 770, 785

(1947).
26
See ANTONIO CASSESE ET AL, THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY 354-55 (2002). See also Hans Kelsen, Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in
International Law?, 1 INT¶L L. Q. 153, 164-65 (1947); BRADLEY SMITH, THE AMERICAN ROAD TO NUREMBERG: THE
DOCUMENTARY RECORD, 1944-1945 86 (1982).
27
See Judgment of October 1, 1946, International Military Tribunal Judgment and Sentences, reprinted
in 41 AM. J. INT¶L L. 172, 249 (1947); Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT¶L L. 178, 205 (1946);
Leila S. Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie
and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT¶L L. 289, 308 (1994); Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against
Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT¶L L. 787, 804 (1999); Lindsay Moir, Crimes Against
Humanity in Historical Perspective, 3 N.Z. Y.B. INT¶L L. 101, 121-22 (2006).
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same time, the Tribunal was relatively lax in finding the requirement satisfied in other instances.28
After the war, the allies incorporated an expanded definition into the law governing
Germany, provoking challenges that prosecutions under the new standard conflicted with the
principle of legality.29 Article 2(1)(c) of the Allied Control Council Law defined crimes against
humanity as:
Atrocities and offenses, including but not limited to murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or
religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the country
where perpetrated.30
However, in the actual conduct of trials under the Control Council Law, tribunal judgments
split on whether or not the war nexus requirement was a necessary part of the definition of crimes
against humanity.31 At the same time, the tribunal started to formulate a new limiting test²focusing
on acts forming part of ³systematic government organized or approved procedures amounting to
atrocities.´32
Following the post-war tribunals, the international community at large recognized the idea
of crimes against humanity, and the newly created International Law Commission (ILC) was
charged with developing the concept.33 In 1950, at its second session, the ILC set forth its first
definition of crimes against humanity in principle 6(c) of its ³Nuremberg Principles,´ defining
crimes against humanity as:
[M]urder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, or other inhuman acts done
against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds, where such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in
execution of or in connection with any crime against peace or any war crime. 34

28
See Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence,
37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT¶L L. 787, 805-6 (1999); cf. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM 257 (1963) (contending
that the ambiguity of the new crime category left tribunal judges with little guidance on when to charge the crime and how
to properly sentence those convicted.).
29
See Charles Jalloh, What Makes a Crime Against Humanity a Crime Against Humanity$P-,QW¶O/
381, 395-96 (2013); Control Council Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against the
Peace and Against Humanity, Art. 2 (1)(c), (1945), reprinted in, 1 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL OF COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 (1951).
30
Control
Council Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes
Against the
Peace and Against Humanity, Art. 2 (1)(c), (1945), reprinted in, 1 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL OF COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 (1951).
31

See Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence,
37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT¶L L. 787, 809-17 (1999).
32
United States v. Altstoetter, Judgment, 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO 10 954 (1951), at 982.
33
See Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(I), at 188 (Dec. 11, 1946); G.A. Res. 177 (II), 111 (Nov. 21, 1947).
34

Jean Spiropoulos (Special Rapporteur on the Formulation of Nürnberg Principles), Formulation of
Nürnberg Principles, 187. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/22 (Apr. 12, 1950).
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Therefore, in its first definition the ILC went with the Nuremberg as opposed to the Allied
Control Council Law approach, maintaining the war nexus requirement as part of the definition,
despite the fact that this requirement might have been purely jurisdictional even from the
beginning.35
By 1954 the ILC had yet another definition, this time presented as article 11 of its Draft
Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. This time around the ILC removed
the war nexus requirement, defining crimes against humanity as:
Inhuman acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or
persecutions, committed against any civilian population on social, political,
racial, religious or cultural grounds by the authorities of a State or by private
individuals acting at the instigation or with the toleration of such authorities. 36
The new attempt proved controversial, however, due to the suggestions that discrimination
should now be shown relative to all of the potential offenses, and that state instigation or toleration
would be required.37
Little concrete work was done on the issue in the following decade, though the war nexus
requirement was chipped away at by the 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of the Statutory
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity and the 1973 International Convention
on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. 38 Thus, by the time work on a new
draft code and definition commenced in the mid 1980s, there was agreement that the war nexus
requirement was no longer necessary.39
The next ILC definition was produced in 1991, following the end of the Cold War. By the
time it had arrived at this new Draft Code, now renamed the Draft Code of Crimes Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, the ILC had hit upon the comparatively more objective formula of
distinguishing crimes against humanity on the basis that they were committed on a ³systematic
manner or on a mass scale.´40 The draft states, under an article headed ³Systematic or Mass
Violations of Human Rights,´ that
[a]n individual who commits or orders the commission of any of the following
violations of human rights: murder; torture; establishing or maintaining over
persons a status of slavery, servitude or forced labour; persecution on social,
political, racial, religious or cultural grounds, in a systematic manner or on a mass
35
See, e.g., ROGER CLARK, Crimes Against Humanity at Nuremberg, in THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 195 (George Ginsburgs & V.N. Kudriavtsev eds., 1990); THEODOR MERON, War Crimes in
Yugoslavia and the Development of International Law, 88 AM. J. INT¶L L. 78, 85 (1994).
36

,QW¶O/&RPP¶Q5HSRQWKH:RUNRI,WV6L[WK6HVVLRQ'UDIW&RGHRI2IIHQVHV$JDLQVWWKH3HDFHDQG
Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc. A/2691, at 150 (1954).
37

See Daniel Johnson, The Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 4 INT¶L &
COMP. L. Q. 445, 465 (1955).
38
See Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence,
37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT¶L L. 787, 823 (1999).
39

Id.

40

,QW¶O/DZ&RPP¶Q5HSRQWKH:RUNRI,WV)RUW\-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/46/10, at 103 (1991). On
the 1991 draft, see Christian Tomuschat, Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind and the Recalcitrant Third
State, in WAR CRIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 41, 49-50 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1996).
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scale; or deportation or forcible transfer of population shall, on conviction
thereof, be sentenced. . .41
The renaming of the 1991 definition is noteworthy, testifying to the clear recognition that
crimes against humanity are a subcategory of systematic and mass human rights violations and,
through that recognition, potentially opening up the door to expansion of the compass of
criminality.42 While the renaming would not stick, it may yet come to be re-recognized in the future.
Once again the next definition would go backwards in suppressing the direct human rights
relation, in failing to recognize the widespread/systematic requirement, and in reintroducing the
war nexus requirement. Article 5 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY Statute) stated that
[t]he International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible
for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international
or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population: (a) murder;
(b) extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation; (e) imprisonment; (f) torture;
(g) rape; (h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; (i) other
inhumane acts.43
While the ICTY Statute therefore linked crimes against humanity to conflict, as had been
done at Nuremberg, this could even more easily be read as simply a jurisdictional limitation, rather
than a substantive definitional component.44 This limitation flows from the logic used at
Nuremberg²since once again an international tribunal was being created, a bold act in and of itself,
limitations would help to bolster potentially challengeable legitimacy. The Tadic decision of the
Appeals Chamber affirmed that the ICTY Statute war nexus requirement was to be understood as
limited because the Court made clear that it understood this component did not form a part of the

41
Id.; LYAL SUNGA, THE EMERGING SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: DEVELOPMENTS IN
CODIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 124-62 (1997); BASSIOUNI, supra note 21, at 189-191.
42

It is also noteworthy and important to observe that what exactly would qualify as systematic or mass was
unclear, with the oEVHUYDWLRQIRULQVWDQFHWKDW³HYHQDFULPHSHUSHWUDWHGDJDLQVWDVLQJOHYLFWLPFRXOGFRQVWLWXWHDFULPH
DJDLQVWKXPDQLW\RQWKHEDVLVRILWVSHUSHWUDWRU¶VPRWLYHVDQGLWVFUXHOW\´%HWK9DQ6FKDDFN The Definition of Crimes
Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT¶L L. 787, 824 n.181 (1999) (citing Summary
Records of the 2379th Meeting>@<%,QW¶O/&RPP¶Q81'RF$&16(5$ 7KH,/&LWVHOIREVHUYHG
it had introduced the new heading because
[t]he common factor in all the acts constituting crimes under this draft article was a serious violation of certain fundamental
human rights. In the light of this idea and bearing in mind the considerable development in the protection of human rights
since the 1954 draft Code, both in the elaboration of international instruments and in the bodies that implement them and in
the universal awareness of the pressing need to protect such rights, the Commission thought it useful to bring out this
common factor in the draft article itself and in the title.
,QW¶O/DZ&RPP¶Q5HSRQWKH:RUNRI,WV)RUW\-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/46/10, at 103 (1991).
43

Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827,

at 6 (2009).
44

See Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence,
37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT¶L L. 787, 827 n.191 (1999).
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definition of crimes against humanity under customary international law. 45 The ICTY also read in
the requirement that the harm in question be widespread or systematic, despite the absence of such
language from the Statute,46 which supplies a post-hoc judicial remedy to address the problematic
initial drafting.47
Article 3 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR Statute)
removed any such reference to an armed conflict, stating that
[t]he International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons
responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic,
racial or religious grounds: a) Murder; b) Extermination; c) Enslavement; d)
Deportation; e) Imprisonment; f) Torture; g) Rape; h) Persecutions on political,
racial and religious grounds; i) Other inhumane acts. 48
The ILC adopted a third definition of crimes against humanity in 1996, as
[a]ny of the following acts, when committed in a systematic manner or on a large
scale and instigated or directed by a Government or by any organization or group:
a) Murder; b) Extermination; c) Torture; d) Enslavement; e) Persecutions on
political, racial, religious or ethnic grounds; f) Institutionalized discrimination on
racial, ethnic or religious grounds involving the violation of fundamental human
rights and freedoms and resulting in seriously disadvantaging a part of the
population; (g) Arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer of population; (h)
Arbitrary imprisonment; (i) Forced disappearance of persons; (j) Rape, enforced
prostitution and other forms of sexual abuse; (k) Other inhumane acts which
severely damage physical or mental integrity, health or human dignity, such as
mutilation and severe bodily harm.49
In its comments on the 1996 definition, the ILC clarified that by systematic it meant an act
committed pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy, while by massive it meant acts involving a
multiplicity of victims.50
Of course, the definition incorporated in the 1998 Rome Statute contains a particular claim
to authority. There, article 7(1) defines crimes against humanity as
any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (a)
45
See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
RQ-XULVGLFWLRQ ,QW¶O&ULP7ULEIRUWKH)RUPHU<XJRVODYLD2FW 
46
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-72SLQLRQDQG-XGJPHQW ,QW¶O&ULP7ULEIRUWKH
Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997).
47

However, the ICTY also read in other unfortunate and unnecessary elements. See Beth Van Schaack, The
Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT¶L L. 787, 828, 832-40 (1999).
48

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955, at 4 (Nov. 8, 1994).

49

,QW¶O/DZ&RPP¶Q5HSRQWKH:RUNRI,WV)RUW\-Eighth Session, art. 18, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532 (1996).

50

See ,QW¶O/DZ&RPP¶Q5HSRQWKH:RUNRI,WV)RUW\-Eighth Session, art. 18 ¶¶ 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/51/10

(1996).
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Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation or forcible transfer
of population; (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in
violation of fundamental rules of international law; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any
other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; (h) Persecution against any
identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural,
religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act
referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; (i)
Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) The crime of apartheid; (k) Other
inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. 51
Article 7(2)(a) adds an additional twist to this definition, which creates a number of
complications. The Rome Statute definition does manage to minimize, however, the potential link
to armed conflict,52 and to dispose with the potential necessity of showing discriminatory grounds.
The progressive features of Article 7 are quite an achievement since Article 7 was developed in
negotiations with 160 countries, and one might have expected the definition to be more restrictive
than its precursors as a result. 53
***
The history of changing definitions of situations of crimes against humanity demonstrates
the manner in which the category has evolved dramatically and constantly over the course of its
relatively brief life²suggesting, especially given the ongoing contestations and uncertainties in
several areas considered below, that further changes are in store in the future as well.
The history demonstrates the roots of the idea of crimes against humanity in the context
of war, but also the manner in which the concept has gradually and consistently transcended and
broken with that framework.54 The history also demonstrates a gradual expansion in the sorts of
51

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

52

Though several states, including China, India, the Russian Federation and a number of Middle Eastern
states argued for its inclusion. See Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the
Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT¶L L. 787, 844 (1999). As scholars have noted, it is unsurprising that the war nexus
should continue to find support, given that it provided a principle means of maintaining the idea of crimes against humanity
within the war crimes sphere and hence the sphere of traditional international law and state sovereignty, as opposed to the
more challenging sphere of human rights. See, e.g., Guyora Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial
of Klaus Barbie, 98 YALE L.J. 1321, 1333, 1989; Elisabeth Zoller, La définition des crimes contre l’humanité, 120 J. DU
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 549, 558 (1993); Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the
Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT¶L L. 787, 846-47 (1999).
53

See Darryl Robinson, Defining ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ at the Rome Conference, 93 AM. J. INT¶L L.

43, 43 (1999).
54

However, accretions from the war context persist in the Rome Statute²demonstrated in the references to
³FLYLOLDQSRSXODWLRQ´³DWWDFN´DQGVRRQ:KLOHVRPHDWWHPSWWRSUHVHUYHDVSHFWVRIWKHOLPLWDWLRQWKHVHWHUPVDSSO\WKH
weight of transitioning interpretation runs against them. Thus, one scholar has noted that the language of attack, for instance,
LVXQIRUWXQDWHDQGWKDWLWZRXOGKDYHEHHQEHWWHULIWKHWHUP³DFWV´ZDVVLPSO\XVHG'DYLG'RQDW-Cattin, Crimes Against
Humanity, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT STATUTE 49, 54-55 (Flavia Lattanzi, ed.,
 ,QWHUQDWLRQDOWULEXQDOVKDYHIRXQGVLPLODUO\REVHUYLQJWKDW³WKHFRQFHSWRIµDWWDFN¶PD\EHGHILQHGDVD>sic] unlawful
act of the kind enumerated [by the statute in question]. An attack may also be non-violent in nature, like imposing a system
of apartheid, which is declared a crime against humanity in Article 1 of the Apartheid Convention of 1973, or exerting
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underlying violations that might be taken to add up to a situation of crimes against humanity, and
the gradual development of a definition focused on the categorization of the harms in question as
widespread or systematic, a test, that is, primarily concerning aggregate level of harm. Taken
together, these developments suggest something even more fundamental²a gradual evolution of
the notion of crimes against humanity in the direction of what might be termed a ³victim-centered
perspective,´ as detailed below.
II. A VICTIM-CENTERED APPROACH

In the first place, a word of caution is needed²the intent in referring to a ³victim-centered
approach´ here is not to make reference to the movement within international criminal law to ensure
greater participation of and attention to victims, though those are aims with which this author
sympathizes. Instead, the intent in this context is to emphasize a ³victim-centered approach´ in
defining situations of crimes against humanity²meaning that the experiences of victims will be
key to determining whether a situation of crimes against humanity may be found to exist or not. In
short, such an approach will tend to clear away convolutions in the definition of the term that are
not responsive to the harm being experienced by victims, leading to an approach to the term focused
on aggregate level of harm.55 To adopt such an approach will not dissolve all complications, of
course; it will, however, help to clear out much unnecessary definitional confusion, and hence to
refocus discussions on crimes against humanity around core underlying issues present but underexplored in current debates.
The victim-centered focus is made possible by, and builds on, the strong emphasis on the
importance of individuals already deeply embedded in the notion of crimes against humanity itself.
As observed in the introduction, in and of itself such a principle is surely unassailable²who could
criticize an approach which foregrounds the situation of victims? The rub, however, comes with
what such an approach inevitably minimizes.
A version of this approach is recognized by Kress, who, drawing on Robinson, refers to it
as ³victim-focused teleological reasoning.´56 Kress launches several arguments that may be taken
as contrary to such an approach. In the first place, Kress critiques the approach on the basis that it

pressure on the population to act in a particular manner, may come under the purview of an attack, if orchestrated on a
PDVVLYH VFDOH RU LQ D V\VWHPDWLF PDQQHU´ 0RKDPHG (OHZD %DGDU From the Nuremberg Charter to the Rome Statute:
Defining the Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, 5 SAN DIEGO INT¶L L.J. 73, 108 (2004) (citing Prosecutor v. Akayesu,
Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, JudgPHQW 6HSW  ,URQLFDOO\WKHWHUP³DWWDFN´ZDVDSSDUHQWO\FKRVHQRXWRIWKH
belief that it might be understood as less restrictive in certain instances; see Darryl Robinson, Defining ‘Crimes Against
Humanity’ at the Rome Conference, 93 AM. J. INT¶L L. 43, 50-51 (1999).
55
As such, the definition of crimes against humanity proposed here is generally in alignment with that
proposed by Geras. NORMAN GERAS, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: BIRTH OF A CONCEPT (Manchester University Press
eds., 1st ed. (2011).
56
See Claus Kress, On the Outer Limits of Crimes against Humanity: The Concept of Organization within
the Policy Requirement: Some Reflections on the March 2010 ICC Kenya Decision, 23 LEIDEN J. INT¶L L. 855, 861 (2010);
Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law, 21 LEIDEN J. INT¶L L. 925, 933-46 (2008). While
supporters of a limited standard employ the labHO³WHOHRORJLFDO´WRWKRVHDUJXLQJIRUDEURDGHUFRQFHSWRIFULPHVDJDLQVW
humanity, that term itself, including its understood pejorative connotation, is in need of radical re-thinking. Without going
LQWRGHWDLOLWLVZRUWKQRWLQJWKDW³WHOHRORJLFDO´WKLnking can be understood to encompass the gradual detailing of general
standards, the working through of convoluted and contradictory norms and laws in favor of universal applicability and the
principle of legality, and the evolution of standards to meet contemporary needs, rather than simply the loose notion of
empty-headed idealism the term seems intended to conjure up.
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conflicts with the approach provided by customary international law.57 Given the complexity and
confusion in both the definition of the terms in question as well as the historical fluidity of the
category of crimes against humanity, however, such an approach is less than convincing. Second,
Kress suggests that advances in international criminal law ³should. . . not be initiated by the
international judiciary but should rather be supported by a solid amount of state practice.´58 This
argument is weak once again to the extent the state of the law is far less clear than Kress contends²
rendering judicial acts in such area the typical and necessary resolution of confusion, rather than a
form of judicial activism.
Other opponents of a broad and flexible understanding of situations of crimes against
humanity, such as Kaul and Schabas, devote a major portion of their attention to Nuremberg and
the roots of the term, arguing in essence that the category should continue to be applied in the ways
it traditionally has been.59 There are several reasons to disfavor such an approach, however. In the
first place, such an approach fails to account for the development of the notion of crimes against
humanity over the course of its history, as explored above. Second, such an approach seems to
convert the particularity of original cases into the boundaries of the generality of the law that is
understood to have been applicable. Third, such an approach fails to account for the potential of
new forms of mass violation, which a flexible, harm-based approach is better able to take into
account.60 Fourth, such an approach seems overly Western-centric (as is, one might argue, so much
of international law), privileging the World War II model of state-orchestrated harm over hazier
situations in which state and non-state actor violence may overlap and intermingle, which have been
prominent in so many parts of the world in the post-World War II era. Fifth, such a conservative
mode of interpretation seems out of place in the context of an area of law that was born out of the
need to address violations as they in fact occur, rather than out of fealty to previously clearly
established legal categories.
At heart, interpreters like Kaul and Kress simply seem to favor a more conservative
approach. The core question, then, is what policy rationales might counsel in favor of such an
approach? Perhaps the closest Kress comes to addressing this question is his suggestion that since
international criminal law goes further than human rights law in limiting state sovereignty, it is
particularly important that it not be subject to progressive interpretation. In particular, Kress argues
that international criminal law

57
See Kress, supra note 56, at 867-71 (arguing that customary international law supports a narrow reading of
µRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶DQGPRUHEURDGO\DKLJKFRQWH[WXDOUHTXLUHPHQWIRUFULPHVDJDLQVWKXPDQLW\ 
58

Id. at 873.

59

See William Schabas, Is Terrorism a Crime Against Humanity, 8 INT¶L PEACEKEEPING 255 (2004); William
Schabas, State Policy as an Element of International Crimes, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 953 (2008); Situation in the
Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to Article 15, Dissent of Judge Kaul (Mar 31, 2010)
60
In this context, it is worth pointing out that the expansion of the notion of crimes against humanity has not
been occurring in a vacuum, nor has it been driven by abstract academic concerns²rather, it has evolved as part and parcel
of an effort to address the worst harms that are actually occurring in the world today. As such, it is important not only that a
standard that can encompass a variety of forms of responsible entities be developed, but also that the notion remain loose
and open and able to evolve to address new forms of mass harm creation. Also emphasizing the later point on the importance
of flexibility, see Alain Pellet, Applicable Law, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY 1056-8 (Antonio Cassese et al eds., 2002); see also David Hunt, High Hopes, ‘Creative Ambiguity’ and an
Unfortunate Mistrust in International Judges, 2 J. INT¶L CRIM. JUST. 56, 59 (2004) (arguing that flexibility in international
criminal law is necessary for it to grow).
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carries with it the competence of properly instituted international. . . courts to
decide on the genuineness of national. . . proceedings, a presumption against
immunities ratione materiae, a presumption in favour of universal jurisdiction,
and a presumption against the power to grant amnesties. 61
The suggestion that such characteristics are unique to international criminal law is quickly
belied by an examination of the work of the regional human rights courts, however, of which all the
same statements could be made.62
Once again, Kress does not quite manage to state what might be taken as the argument at
the heart of his position²that is, why a conservative approach should be favored over a progressive
one. Extrapolating, therefore, and assuming that the exponent of such an argument is in favor of the
application of the category of crimes against humanity in general (for if not resistance is far easier
to understand), the core argument behind such a position would appear to be the backlash argument.
In other words, if the law is pushed too far in a progressive direction, a backlash may occur, leaving
the ultimate state of the law in a worse position than when the progressive push started.
Even where it is most studied, relative to domestic court decisions, the backlash hypothesis
is deeply contested. There is perhaps even more reason to be skeptical relative to the international
realm, where²at least where progressive interpretation is conducted gradually²states are likely to
adjust to new developments, rather than to challenge them. That rapid progressive change may not
be possible should not deter one from advocating such change²rather it should merely make one
realistic as to the pace at which the change in question may occur. Finally, and perhaps most
essentially of all, it should be recognized that the progressive changes in question are not strictly
opposed to state interests in the manner that Kress seems to presume: first, because progression in
the understanding of situations of crimes against humanity of the sort advocated here consists, in
significant part, in reorientation rather than simply expansion; second, because expansions in the
framework may be taken as in the interests of states, insofar as states are concerned²as in fact so
many are²with addressing the worst situations of mass rights violation around the world; and third,
because jurisdiction in international criminal law remains governed by the sovereignty-respecting
principle of complementarity.
Another significant concern for Kress and Kaul appears to be the limited capacity of the
ICC. Such limited capacity is a fact; the response, however, should be a principled prioritization or
triage, in which the court focuses on the most severe instances of violation, rather than an approach
which refuses to consider some such instances on the basis of formalistic criteria.
The piece upon which Kress dwells, Robinson¶s article on the tensions within international
criminal law, draws a different binary, emphasizing tensions internal to international criminal law

61

Kress, supra note 56, at 861.

62

One might also observe, further to the point made above, that it is strange that Kress recognizes the
sovereignty-limiting principle inherent to crimes against humanity, while seeking to limit its use to interpret that body of
law at the same time.
Kress is right, however, to observe that international criminal law has served to highlight an understanding that has been
deeply contested in the human rights context ± that human rights obligations should be understood as horizontal as well as
vertical. InsteaGRIUHMHFWLQJWKLVUHFRJQLWLRQDV.UHVVZRXOGKDYHLWKRZHYHULWVHHPVIDUSUHIHUDEOHWRIROORZ&ODSKDP¶V
approach, accepting and recognizing the horizontal component of rights violations. See Kress, supra note 56, at 860 (citing
Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Organized Armed Groups, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW: ORGANIZED ARMED GROUPS: A CHALLENGE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 103 (Marco Odello & Gian
Luca Beruto eds., 2010)).
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due to its dual basis in both the liberal criminal law context and the human rights/humanitarian law
context.63 While Robinson is careful to emphasize that he is seeking to highlight an internal tension
and not necessarily taking sides, it is hard to read the piece without coming to the conclusion that
international criminal law must do more to recognize liberal criminal defense principles.
Those who follow such a reading might well be among those who criticize the approach
at hand² they might contend that such a strongly assertive, progressive approach will do even
more to undermine the already weakened system of rights for the accused. The position advanced
here however is that in fact the opposite may be the case. In order to assert that an individual has
committed crimes against humanity, two separate things must be shown²the situation must be
found to amount to one of crimes against humanity; and the individual in question must be found
culpable relative to a constituent harm.64 A reconstructed and, in some ways, more liberal approach
to the first question concerning the definition of situations may bring with it both increased
normative pressure and expanded potential for other forms of sanction. It may then be possible to
tip the scales in the other direction on the other side of the equation²strengthening the rights of
individual defendants at the individual liability stage of international criminal trials, now that
criminal sanction alone is not forced to carry the full weight of remedial responsibility.
III. RESPONSIBLE ENTITIES

The first question that must be addressed relative to situations of crimes against humanity
is what sorts of entities may be responsible for creating such situations. A victim-centered approach
favors liberality in terms of the recognition of the types of entity that may be responsible. In this
context, any form of entity to which responsibility for harms rising to the necessary level of gravity
can in fact be attributed²be it state, organization or individual²should be recognized as
potentially responsible for, or as partaking in, the creation of a situation of crimes against humanity.
Arguments have, of course, been raised against such a position. Besides the more general
arguments of Kress, discussed above, Bassiouni has aligned himself against expansion of liability
beyond states, arguing, for instance, that when
[C]rimes are committed as part of a state¶s policy, it is likely to produce largescale victimization. . . . [I]t is not the quantum of the resulting harm that controls,
but the potentiality of large-scale harm that could derive from a state¶s abuse of
power. In other words, when state actors abuse the power of a state, there is little
that can stop them before they carry out their course of conduct against a civilian
population. . . .65
The weakness of such a position is already apparent in the text itself. Bassiouni insightfully
identifies a key component of assessing the gravity of a situation, dealt with further below²the
importance of considering potential future harm, and not merely harm committed to date. The core
63

See Robinson, supra note 56.

64

In the crimes against humanity context, the situational gravity threshold question is of course contained in
the requirement that the act be commLWWHG µDV SDUW RI D ZLGHVSUHDG RU V\VWHPDWLF DWWDFN GLUHFWHG DJDLQVW DQ\ FLYLOLDQ
SRSXODWLRQ¶
65
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION AND CONTEMPORARY
APPLICATION 10 (2011). See also deGuzman, supra note 2, at 368-9 (2000), commenting on BASSIOUNI, supra note 21, at
248-9.
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emphasis remains on aggregate of harm and potential harm²an emphasis in full agreement with
the position adopted here. The natural result of such an emphasis, however, is that should an
individual cause or have the potential to cause a greater amount of harm than a state might, there
would be a stronger claim that his or her acts be understood to create a situation of crimes against
humanity.66
One might also argue that limiting the potential for situations of crimes against humanity
to be created only by the actions of states is a progressive choice²since states are, in general, amply
able to punish those they consider major criminals, it is important to retain the crimes against
humanity category for state harms. 67 A strong argument can be made in favor of such a position²
that expanding the framework would allow states to divert attention from themselves. However,
strong arguments can be made on the other side as well. Overall, such an approach would help to
establish a common framework under which individuals, organizations and states could all be held
liable. The potential value of such an approach can, for instance, be seen if one considers the
terrorism context²as consideration of state and terrorist crimes under the same framework might
help to ensure state commission of similar acts is recognized as such, to create a more realistic,
comparative weighing of the harm arising from such sources in comparison to other harms, and to
ensure such harms are no longer dealt with by an isolated legal regime that breeds abusive standards.
The Kenya case before the ICC is helpful for highlighting some of the complexities of
identification of responsible entities in practice, and the value of a loose standard relative to
responsible entities. In his dissent at the Article 15 stage in that case, Judge Kaul argued that it was
not clear a policy could be identified to commit the violence in question, or that it could be traced
to a single entity.68 Judge Kaul¶s decision could be critiqued on many levels²one could disagree
66
Similarly, Schabas argues that the policy element should be maintained, due to the need to encompass
more serious violations. See William Schabas, Prosecuting Dr. Strangelove, Goldfinger, and the Joker at the International
Criminal Court: Closing the Loopholes, 23 LEIDEN J. INT¶ L. 847-9 (2010). Once again, though, the key emphasis is on
extent of harm, for which a policy or states-only requirement presents only a broad and vague cypher.

The example of individuals often seems misleading in this context, since it is hard to imagine that an individual without
links to what could be characterized as one sort of organization or another would have the resources necessary to commit
harm of the requisite level of gravity. Should they be able to do so, however, it is not clear why they should be excluded
from capacity to commit crimes against humanity. As others have recognized:
Are there not forces and organizations whose powers might be greater and whose actions might be
more extensive than those of certain countries represented institutionally at the United Nations? Care
is required because other methods of total abuse of the human condition could equal in horror, albeit
from other aspects, those of which we have just spoken.
Leila Sadat, Crimes Against Humanity in the Modern Age, 107 AM. J. INT¶L. L. 334, 354 (2013) (citing Cass. Crim., Jan. 26,
1984, JCP 1984 1120, 197 (submission of French Advocate Dontenwille)). The statement here still refers to organizations,
but its logic is equally applicable to powerful individuals. See also Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09, Pre-Trial
Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation
in the Republic of Kenya, ¶¶ 89-90 (Mar 31, 2010).
67
See, e.g., William Schabas, Is Terrorism a Crime Against Humanity, 8 INT¶L PEACEKEEPING 255, 259-60
(2004) (arguing that crimes against humanity were originally developed for atrocities that were not punishable by judicial
authorities and not for terrorist groups); William Schabas, State Policy as an Element of International Crimes, 98 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 953, 974 (2008) (arguing that it is not necessary to define terrorism as an international crime because
States where terrorism occurs can prosecute those responsible).
68

See Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to Article 15,
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with his reading of the facts, for instance, and one could bolster such a position by arguing for a
loose standard at such an early stage in a judicial determination. The majority decision in the case
may be taken to go even further, however, gesturing towards how entities may be defined²as it
might be taken that a finding of a situation of crimes against humanity would be found in such a
case without responsibility being unitarily attributed to one particular entity, but rather to a web of
interconnected actors and entities, unity among which consists of and is demonstrated by their
commission of a unified set of violations.69 The case also demonstrates the close relationship
between a loose standard and evidential questions²with Judge Kaul¶s standard tending to shield
the state, allowing for situations of crimes against humanity not to be found, despite compelling
evidence of concerted violations, on the basis that the necessary internal working of the mechanisms
of violence in question are inaccessible.
Another hypothetical scenario may help to demonstrate the superiority of a flexible test in
this area as well. Imagine a situation of cross-border human trafficking involving work conditions
amounting to slavery. The activity would be driven both by corrupt members of the authorities on
both sides of the flow of people, as well as shadowy organizations and individuals involved in the
human trafficking business, and perhaps supported by a variety of corporations involved in
obtaining and supplying the labor force in question. In such a situation, not only do evidential
questions once again arise, but even if they were settled a problem remains insofar as the situation
is created by a combination of actors at different levels. While states are involved in multiple ways,
including both through the criminal acts of their corrupt agents as well as through a failure to
protect, the situation on a whole is created by a combination of state and non-state actors. The
hypothetical also helps to highlight the absurdity of requiring a state element in the creation of the
situation as a core component of the definition²as, should such component be found sufficient
even on the state-centric approach in a situation like the one in question, presumably all the actors
involved could then in fact be prosecuted, which is indeed the very point of the category of crimes
against humanity. Moreover, like the Kenya example, the hypothetical highlights the fact that states
are not unitary actors but instead consist of multiple conflicting groups and individuals, often
primarily motivated by private interests²once again counseling in favor of a more flexible
approach.
Finally, it is worth noting that in the war crimes context, the distinction has long since
broken down²with non-state participants in conflicts being recognized as potential committers of
war crimes just as state parties¶ agents are, and with the situational test of whether or not a conflict
exists being based on a factual inquiry.
The position of the majority is the position a victim-centered approach supports ± a
position that takes seriously the perspective and understanding of those involved in and suffering
from the situation in question. To recognize that a common responsible entity may be found in such
a case is also to observe the close inter-relationship between determining responsible entities and
determining the boundaries of the situation in question. In this context, it is in fact the second part
of the equation, the problem of recognizing how the boundaries of a particular situation should be
defined, that is particularly complex and vexing; it is to this problem that we now turn.

Dissent of Judge Kaul, ¶¶ 147-52 (Mar 31, 2010).
69

See Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09, Pre-7ULDO&KDPEHU,,'HFLVLRQRQWKH3URVHFXWRU¶V
Application for Summons, ¶ 22-5 (Mar 8, 2011).
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IV. DEFINING SITUATIONS

One of the most perplexing elements of defining situations of crimes against humanity
concerns the definition of situations. This section will first turn to current legal standards in this
area, exploring how reference to the policy requirement has muddied the waters. The section will
then attempt to go beyond current standards to explore the hard questions at the heart of the problem
of defining situations. Given the lack of attention to these issues, the primary contribution of this
piece can only be to clear the field and to focus attention on such questions, in the hope that further
definitional clarity may be achieved in time. At the same time, however, this piece attempts to go
as far as possible towards developing a framework of thought through which to approach such
issues, in the hope that this may provide a useful starting point for further explorations.
A.

The Policy Requirement

Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute states
[f]or the purpose of this Statute, ³crime against humanity´ means any of the
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack[.] 70
Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute requires that such attack be ³pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.´71
What exactly the policy requirement entails has never been entirely clear. 72 It has, hence,
been a matter of great debate within the literature, with scholars arguing both about the meaning of
the term and the rationales in support of different interpretations. Primarily, scholars have argued
in favor of a loose reading of the term, despite the more precise meaning the word ³policy´ seems
to connote.73 Among other arguments, scholars have emphasized that a loose reading of the policy
70

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7(1), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

71

Id. at art. 7(2)(a).

72

As Mettraux points out, from the beginning Maxwell Fyfe expressed reservations about the policy
requirement due to its lack of clarity. See Guénaël Mettraux, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity and the Question
of a “Policy” Element, in FORGING A CONVENTION FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 142-43 (Leila Nadya Sadat ed. 2011)
(citing International Conference on Military Trials, London 1945, Minutes of Conference Session of 19 July 1945,
concerning the definitions of crimes within the jurisdiction of the IMT, reprinted in REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED
STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS, LONDON 1945, at 301 (1949)).
73
See deGuzman, supra note 2, at 374; Phyllis Hwang, Defining Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 22 FORDHAM INT¶L L. J. 457, 502-3 (1998); Guénaël Mettraux, Crimes Against
Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 43
HARV. INT¶L L.J. 237, 270-82 (2002); Darryl Robinson, Defining ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ at the Rome Conference, 93
AM. J. INT¶L L. 43, 50-   FLWLQJ3URVHFXWRUY7DGLƛ&DVH1R,7-94-1-72SLQLRQDQG-XGJPHQW ,QW¶O&ULP
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997) for the proposition that the policy in question need not be formalized and
might be deduced from the circumstances); Leila Nadya Sadat, Crimes Against Humanity in the Modern Age, 107 AM. J.
INT¶L. L. 334, 371 (2013) (emphasizing that the policy requirement was added to the Rome Statute at the last minute). See
generally ROBERT CRYER, Håkan Friman, Darryl Robinson & Elizabeth Wilmhurst, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (Cambridge University Press, 2007); Matt Halling, Push the Envelope²Watch it Bend:
Removing the Policy Requirement and Extending Crimes Against Humanity, 23 LEIDEN J. INT¶L L. 827 (2010),
https://perma.cc/697S-X22J (advocating for removing the state or organizational policy requirement from the definition of
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requirement seems essential simply given the structure of the Rome Statute definition. Since it is
difficult to distinguish the policy requirement from the ³systematic´ requirement, a strong reading
inevitably converts the disjunctive ³or´ in ³widespread or systematic´ into the conjunctive ³and.´74
On the other hand, a few scholars have also come down in favor of a stringent policy requirement,
basing their arguments primarily on either a historical approach or on an understood merging of the
policy requirement and the requirement that crimes against humanity can only be committed by
states or state-like entities.75
Much of the debate and confusion around the policy requirement likely derives from the
fact that there is in a sense a missing, implicit requirement in the Rome Statute²a requirement that
can perhaps best be referred to as the ³common situation requirement.´ In order to demonstrate a
situation of widespread or systematic violation, in other words, one cannot simply pick violations
at random; rather, one must show that a common situation exists linking the violations and evidence
one presents. Hence, some commentators have assigned the policy requirement this role, making it
the criterion upon which unassociated crimes in the context of a crime wave are not considered to
constitute a situation of crimes against humanity, for instance.76 The question, then, is whether the
policy requirement provides an appropriate criterion under which to resolve such a definitional
problem. The answer provided by this paper, needless to say, is no; rather than providing clarity,
reference to the policy requirement has in fact obscured the difficult question at the heart of defining
situations.
B.

Defining Common Situations

The question of how common situations are to be defined has two parts: first, what sorts
of evidence justify understanding violations as interlinked; second, how are the temporal limits of
a situation to be defined.
Determining whether violations are interlinked involves overlapping inquiries into several
different questions. In the first place, unifying characteristics of the victim group may help to show
how the violations in question form part of a common situation²one might think of the situation
of African Americans, for instance, or indigenous peoples, or of other identity-defined groups. In
the second place, the violation itself may provide evidence of a connection²where similar
violations are being committed against multiple different victims by the same responsible entity,
evidence exists of a common situation. Such commonality may in fact span considerable geographic
and victim-class differences²one might think for instance of problematic instances of the use of
crimes against humanity); Guénaël Mettraux, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity and the Question of a “Policy”
Element, in FORGING A CONVENTION FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 142 (Leila Nadya Sadat ed., 2011). A loose reading
has of course also been adopted by the ICC; see Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09, Pre-Trial Chamber II,
Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the
Republic of Kenya, ¶¶ 84-88 (Mar. 31, 2010).
74
See, e.g., deGuzman, The Road From Rome, supra note 2, at 372 (citing The South Asia Human Rights
Documentation Center, The North Americans Re-Write Customary International Law: An “And” by Any Other Name is Still
an “And´ -XO\ 
75

See generally Claus Kress, On the Outer Limits of Crimes against Humanity: The Concept of Organization
within the Policy Requirement: Some Reflections on the March 2010 ICC Kenya Decision, 23 LEIDEN J. INT¶L L. 855 (2010);
William A. Schabas, State Policy as an Element of International Crimes, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 953 (2008).
76
See, e.g., Darryl Robinson, Essence of Crimes against Humanity Raised by Challenges at ICC, EUR. J.
INT¶L L. BLOG (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.ejiltalk.org/essence-of-crimes-against-humanity-raised-by-challenges-at-icc/
[https://perma.cc/E4NL-29EV].
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force or surveillance abroad that are then brought home; or of policing practices applied on the one
hand against dissidents and on the other against migrants and refugees. Third, where there is
evidence that violations committed in different manners against different groups share a common
motivation, for instance of ensuring authoritarian control, those violations too may be understood
as linked. While the ³policy´ requirement suggests a relatively conservative and limited approach
to recognizing such interconnections, a victim-centered approach suggests a far more liberal
methodology to these questions.
To lay out such factors does not, of course, provide much more than a starting point for
considering how to define the limits of situations, from which the infinitely demanding task of
applying legal categories to concrete facts may begin. The greater the clarity around and attention
to such issues, however, the greater will be the usefulness of future jurisprudence in helping to
explore the best way of thinking about such parameters.
The second question, as laid out above, is how to define the temporal boundaries of a
particular situation.77 This question is even more vexed than the question of inter-linkages. On the
one hand, as long as violations are interlinked, one might understand them as all adding up to a
single situation, over the course of time. On the other hand, in assessing gravity, what is important
is clearly the aggregate of harm committed within a concentrated period of time. As such, the
question becomes, how are the parameters of such a concentrated period to be assessed? An
arbitrary numerical delimitation (e.g. five years) would not do justice to the complexity of such
situations in reality. Given the close connection to the question of aggregate harm²and the
consequent complexities of temporal position relative to the assessment of situations²this question
is delayed for the moment, to be picked up at the conclusion of the examination of aggregate harm,
to which we now turn.
V. AGGREGATE HARM

Wherever one might land on the liberality of the victim-based approach, it has the clear
additional merit of simplifying the notion of crimes against humanity and centering the factual
inquiry as to whether or not such a situation in fact exists around the question of aggregate level of
harm.
A.

The “Widespread or Systematic” Requirement

The primary test of whether a level of aggregate harm sufficient to constitute a situation
of crimes against humanity may be found, that has developed as a core component of the definition
of crimes against humanity over the course of the history of the term, is whether the violations in
question are ³widespread´ or ³systematic,´ with the understanding that only one such category must
be shown to apply.78
An underlying violation will be considered ³widespread´ where

77

The importance of this question has been recognized by the ICC. See, e.g., Situation in the Republic of
Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to Article 15, ICC-01/09, ¶¶ 205-7 (Mar. 31, 2010) (utilizing a liberal
approach to temporal scope).
78
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-$-XGJHPHQW ,QW¶O&ULP7ULE
for the Former Yugoslavia, June 12, 2002), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/acjug/en/kun-aj020612e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EJ2W-7S4C].
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the inhumane acts [are] committed on a large scale meaning that the acts are
directed against a multiplicity of victims. . . The term ³large scale´ is sufficiently
broad to cover various situations involving multiplicity of victims, for example,
as a result of the cumulative effect of a series of inhumane acts or the singular
effect of an inhumane act of extraordinary magnitude.79
The definition of systematic has been subject to more controversy. In some cases it has
been defined as including a policy element²thus Tadic states that a violation will be considered
systematic where it is committed ³pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy. The implementation
of this plan or policy could result in the repeated or continuous commission of inhuman acts.´80
Akayesu endorses this in stating that
[t]he concept of systematic may be defined as thoroughly organized and
following a regular pattern on the basis of a common policy involving substantial
public or private resources. There is no requirement that this policy must be
adopted formally as the policy of a state. There must however be some kind of
preconceived plan or policy. 81
The Kunarac Appeals Chamber judgment, on the other hand, states that
[t]he phrase ³systematic´ refers to ³the organized nature of the acts of violence
and the improbability of their random occurrence´. The Trial Chamber correctly
noted that ³patterns of crimes²that is the non-accidental repetition of similar
criminal conduct on a regular basis²are a common expression of such systematic
occurrence´ . . neither the attack nor the acts of the accused need to be supported
by any form of ³policy´ or ³plan´ . . It may be useful in establishing that the
attack was directed against a civilian population and that it was widespread or
systematic (especially the latter) to show that there was in fact a policy or plan,
but it may be possible to prove these things by reference to other matters.82

79

,QW¶O /DZ &RPP¶Q 5HS RQ WKH :RUN RI LWV )RUW\-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/51/10, at 47 (1996),
http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_51_10.pdf&lang=EFSXP [https://perma.cc/5ZRWYAL2]; see also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-72SLQLRQDQG-XGJPHQW ,QW¶O&ULP7ULEIRUWKH)RUPHU
Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber May 7, 1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf [https://perma.
cc/CC3A-MLH9].
80

,QW¶O /DZ &RPP¶Q 5HS RQ WKH :RUN RI LWV )RUW\-Eighth Session, UN Doc A/51/10, at 47 (1996),
http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_51_10.pdf&lang=EFSXP [https://perma.cc/5ZRWYAL2]; see also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-72SLQLRQDQG-XGJPHQW ,QW¶O&ULP7ULEIRUWKH)RUPHU
Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber May 7, 1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf [https://perma.
cc/CC3A-MLH9].
81
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-7-XGJHPHQW ,QW¶O&ULP7ULEIRU5ZDQGD6HSW
1998), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/acjug/en/kun-aj020612e.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG9F-B33Q].
82

Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-$-XGJHPHQW ,QW¶O&ULP7ULEIRUWKH
Former
Yugoslavia,
June
12,
2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CC3A-MLH9]. As the tribunal starts to recognize in the judgment, the difference between the two
standards is perhaps best understood as a matter of evidence. See, BASSIOUNI, supra note 21, at 196-99. The result of the
Kunarac decision, therefore, is that systematicity can be shown either by showing intent, or by showing pattern or practice.
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That widespread harms may ground a finding of sufficient gravity of aggregate harm is
unsurprising. Where harms are widespread, moreover, the systematic nature of the harms in
question may be presumed. Why should systematic harm, that one cannot also show to be
widespread, also be taken as evidence of a situation of sufficient gravity however? Two rationales
present themselves. In the first place, evidentiary issues are frequently very challenging in the
context of demonstrating major rights violations. As such, pointing to the systematic nature of
harms may be taken as a way of suggesting that the harms in question extend beyond what can
otherwise be shown. In the second place²and uniquely to the assessment of ongoing situations of
violation²demonstrating the systematic nature of the harm in question may be taken, together with
assessment of the capacity of the responsible entity, 83 as strong grounds to fear for extensive further
violations of the sort in question. This prompts an assessment of the situation from a
contemporaneous perspective as one amounting to one of crimes against humanity on the basis in
part of the potential of future harm.
B.

Underlying Harms

Only certain sorts of violations have been taken as significant in terms of determining
whether a situation of crimes against humanity exists. Primarily, these are what might be classified
as integrity rights violations²harms to life and limb and forms of physical violence and coercion²
killings, torture, rape, slavery, and so on.
While a certain magnitude of such integrity harms would seem to constitute an essential
component of situations of crimes against humanity, the definition of the term to date may be taken
to go beyond such purely integrity harms as well. The Rome Statute list, provided above, is the
most comprehensive to date. Several terms within that list²specifically ³[i]mprisonment or other
severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law[,]´
apartheid, ³[o]ther inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health[,]´ and persecution²all appear to push the
boundaries beyond the integrity rights realm. 84
First, the Rome Statute refers to ³[i]mprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law[.]´85 While on the one hand,
imprisonment constitutes a form of physical coercion and an integrity harm, it also quickly presents
a much more complicated issue, as determining whether or not the deprivation of liberty in question
violates the fundamental rules of international law will quickly come to involve an extensive
assessment of both a country¶s penal code and the manner in which its justice system functions in
the criminal realm in general. Inclusion of such a form of violation alone converts potential
application of the Rome Statute from coverage only of situations involving massive physical
violence to situations of mass and unjust criminal and prison systems as well.
On a more general level, such a focus helps to shift one¶s imagination of the sorts of
situations which might come to be classified as situations of crimes against humanity²with the
category now encompassing more clearly repressive, authoritarian regimes²or states that apply
such regimes to particular components of their population²as well as situations involving
excessive levels of physical violence. The category of apartheid²too internally complex to go into
in detail here²clearly helps to shift the overall potential focus of situations of crimes against
83

7KLVHPSKDVLVSLFNVXS%DVVLRXQL¶VSRLQWDERXWSRWHQWLDOIRUIXWXUHKDUPGLVFXVVHGDERYH
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Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
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humanity in this direction as well, focused, as it is, on a situation of overall political discrimination
and inequality.
The catch-all clause of the Rome Statute, referring to ³[o]ther inhumane acts[,]´ provides
another basis for a potentially broad understanding of those crimes that constitute crimes against
humanity.86 The definition provided by the ICTY and ICTR to such a term was broad, understanding
serious attacks on human dignity, as well as acts causing serious suffering or injury, to amount to
crimes against humanity;87 the 1996 ILC definition, as noted above, was similar. 88 Scholars too
have argued for a broader interpretation of this clause. 89 The ICC on the other hand has suggested,
unsurprisingly, that it will read this clause cautiously. 90 Nonetheless, the presence of the term
provides a clear avenue by which the category of underlying harms may be expanded in time.
The category of persecution has been saved for last because it presents yet another way of
thinking about such issues. In the first place, the inclusion of the term as one category of potential
underlying harm helps to expand and reorient the notion of crimes against humanity along the same
grounds as does reference to apartheid, discussed above. 91 The Rome Statute does not assert
persecution as one more category among equals however²rather, persecution is defined as a crime
that may underlie a finding of crimes against humanity only where it is connected to another act.92
This is, at first encounter, an odd way in which to define the harms that may underlay a
situation of crimes against humanity. On further reflection, however, such a rule begins to make
some sense. In the first place, a certain level of harms of the sort defined by the other articles of
Article 7 of the Rome Statute is required in order for a situation to potentially qualify as one of
crimes against humanity. Once sufficient gravity of such harms is present²the level of which will
be less than what would otherwise be necessary to constitute a situation of crimes against
humanity²additional, ³persecution´ harms may be considered, adding weight to the gravity
calculation as a whole, and allowing a more comprehensive assessment of the ultimate situation to
be produced.
Persecution may hence be a bridge through which categories of rights violation otherwise
excluded from the Rome Statute list may be examined when the weight of violations encompassed
86

Id.

87

Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-7-XGJHPHQW ,QW¶O&ULP7ULEIRU5ZDQGD0D\
21, 1999), http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-95-1/trial-judgements/en/990521.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9HLR-YAE7]; Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-7 -XGJHPHQW   ,QW¶O &ULP 7ULE IRU
Rwanda, I June 7, 2001); Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-7-XGJHPHQW ,QW¶O&ULP7ULEIRUWKH)RUPHU
Yugoslavia, Mar. 3, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/tjug/en/bla-tj000303e.pdf [https://perma.cc/A87M-WG3J].
88

See ,QW¶O/DZ&RPP¶Q5HSRQWKH:RUNRILWV)RUW\-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/51/10, at 47 (1996).
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See, e.g., Bernhard Kuschik, Humaneness, Humankind and Crimes Against Humanity, 2 GOETTINGEN J.
INT¶L L. 501, 502-10 (2010).
90
Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 450-53, 455 (Sept.
30, 2008). In paragraph 450 however the ICC also leaves open significant grounds for expansion of the term, observing that
international human rights law should be looked to in determining the meaning of other inhumane acts.
91

The category of persecution is potentially extremely broad; for listings of acts falling under this category,
see STEVEN RATNER & JASON ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 74 (1st ed. 1997); Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement and
Sentence, ¶¶ 22, 1072- ,QW¶O &ULP 7rib. for Rwanda, I Dec. 3, 2003); David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against
Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT¶L L. 85, 99-101 (2004).
92
See Nahimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment, ¶ 986 (Nov. 28, 2007) (explaining that
KDWHVSHHFKDORQHFDQQRWEH³DYLRODWLRQRIWKHULJKWVWROLIHIUHHGRPDQGSK\VLFDOLQWHJULW\RIWKHKXPDQEHLQJ´LQWKH
absence of additional acts causing physical injury).
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by that list is sufficient. In this manner, socioeconomic as well as civil and political rights violations
might all come to form part of the picture. 93
C.

Aggregate Harm and Temporality

The final question, of course, and the most significant, is how aggregate harm is to be
determined. There is no magic formula to answer the question of sufficient level of harm, which
will inevitably require a hard, contextual determination.
A few helpful general points as to how the inquiry should be made may be laid out,
however. In the first place, as the above has demonstrated, the inquiry must take into account both
different types of harms that may be understood as part of the same situation, each of which may
carry different weight, as well as the overall extent of the harm. Where the weight of ³core´ harms
is substantial, but not enough in itself to ground a finding of a situation of crimes against humanity,
other sorts of ³persecution´ harms may also be considered in conducting the weighing. In any event,
the final analysis should include an assessment of all the harms that may be found part of the
situation in question.
One of the hardest questions in fact, however, delayed from two previous sections for
further consideration here, concerns the temporal delimitation of situations. The first point to note
in this context is that the temporal relationship between the assessor and the situation in question
matters.
Assessment of past situations will allow for a fuller and more dispassionate assessment.
Precipitating events will be context specific, but are likely to include significant political moments
or the first instances of violation of a type that will come to be regularly repeated. Concluding
events are likely to have a similar character. In such context, as noted above, the quantity of time
in which the harms in question occur will be a key part of the analysis. Attempting to define in
advance the parameters of such temporality would be like attempting to quantify in some absolute
way the level of harm that must be found; rather, such questions must be left to context-specific
assessment.
Assessment of ongoing situations will be the same when it comes to precipitating events²
though the absence of the greater perspective afforded by history may mean that certain early
manifestations of the situation in question may be hard to identify. The ongoing nature of the
situation in question, however, will mean that there is no attempt to identify an endpoint; the final
assessment of whether the situation rises to the necessary level of gravity will, instead, involve an
assessment of expected future harm.
In this context, of course, something like a paradoxical situation may arise²an ongoing
situation may be assessed as one of crimes against humanity, due to the effects of such assessment,
to then be subject to the sorts of pressure that may, in the course of time, succeed in preventing the
93

Of course, where socioeconomic rights violations amount to the harms listed in the Rome Statute, for
instance loss of life, they may be directly considered. The reason for the exclusion of civil and political rights violations
from the scope of the definition of situations of crimes against humanity is likely the fact that these violations are not
considered crimes committed by individuals, but rather, on the classic liberal approach, harms committed by states. As
Luban has convincingly argued, however, there is strong reason to apply the label crimes against humanity to instances of
severe political persecution, as characterized in major part by civil and political rights violations. See generally David Luban,
A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT¶L L. 85, 99 (2004). The concept of persecution should hence be
thoroughly utilized to ensure all the violations involved in such situations may be considered.
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situation from arising to the level of gravity typically associated with such situations. This is of
course a benign paradox, however, in that it presents the sort of outcome most devoutly to be
desired.
VI. OTHER WIDESPREAD OR SYSTEMATIC HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

The paper so far has attempted to reconstruct the notion of situations of crimes against
humanity. This reconstruction has had multiple aims. In the first place, a victim-centered approach
has been advocated in order to attempt to ensure that the concept is of maximum use relative to
actually existing situations of mass harm. Second, by attempting to cut through much existing
complication, the hope has been to simplify and clarify the potential use of the term, in order to
encourage its more frequent and assertive invocation.
The paper has a third purpose as well, however. The term crimes against humanity, even
on the liberal approach advocated, is still limited in its applicability to situations involving harms
of the type enumerated in the Rome Statute. 94 An approach identical to that applied to the
determination of situations of crimes against humanity may be applied more broadly to other sorts
of determinations of widespread or systematic human rights violations, with the latter label being
applied in instances involving primarily other forms of violations, as well as to instances in which
the aggregate level of harm necessary to constitute a situation of crimes against humanity has not
been reached.95 Situations of widespread or systematic human rights violation hence form an
umbrella category, encompassing but going beyond situations of crimes against humanity, with
situations potentially crossing over from one category to the other as they worsen or improve. In
addition, there is perhaps the need for another category that may lie in the concentric circle between
94

This limitation is motivated in part by the need to ensure that the category retains its rhetorical power
through application only to the worst situations of harm. In fact, this means that the aggregate level of harm necessary to
constitute a situation of crimes against humanity, as well as being indefinite, will also vary depending on context²as the
level should constantly be calibrated in order to capture only the worst instances of violation. Geras, supra note 2, at 94-95
(stating that the key is to achieve the right equilibrium between how the term is used for triggering purposes and an
understood potential liberality of scope).
95
There has in fact been a certain though loose recognition of such a concept in the human rights context,
which has taken place not only in the reports of commissions of inquiry, of NGOs, and of supranational rights-monitoring
bodies, but also in the jurisprudence of supranational rights tribunals; for instance, such tribunals have recognized the
H[LVWHQFHRI³PDVVLYHDQGVHULRXVYLRODWLRQV´DGPLQLVWUDWLYHDQGOHJLVODWLYHSUDFWLFHVRIYLRODWLRQDQG³SUHYDLOLQJFRQGLWLon,
SDWWHUQRUSUDFWLFHRIYLRODWLRQV´RQQXPHURXVRFFDVLRQVZKLOHFRQVLGHULQJH[FHSWLRQVWRWKHUXOHRIH[KDXVWLRQ. See, e.g.,
Akdivar v. Turkey, App. No. 21893/93, Eur Ct. H.R., ¶ 67 (Aug. 30, 1996); Aksoy v. Turkey, App. No. 21987/93, Eur Ct.
+5 'HF $PQHVW\,QW¶OY6XGDQ&RPPXQLFDWLRQV$IU&RPP¶Q+35
33 (Nov. 15, 1999); Article 19 v. Eritrea, Communication 275/03, Afr. Comm¶Q+35 0D\ $XVWULDY
,WDO\$SS1R<%(XU&RQYRQ+5 (XU&RPP¶QRQ+5 &\SUXVY7XUNH\$SS1R
<%(XU&RQYRQ+5 (XU&RPP¶QRQ+5 'HQPDUNY*UHHFH$SS1RV321-3/67, 3344/67, 11
<%(XU&RQYRQ+5  (XU&RPP¶QRQ+5 'HQPDUNY*UHHFH$SS1R<%
(XU&RQYRQ+5 (XU&RPP¶QRQ+5 'HQPDUNY7XUNH\$SS1R(XU&W+5 -XQH
1999); Donnelly v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 5577-<%(XU&RQYRQ+5 (XU&RPP¶QRQ+5 
)UHH /HJDO $VVLVWDQFH*USY=DLUH&RPPXQLFDWLRQV$IU&RPP¶Q+35 $SU
1996); Greece v. United Kingdom, ApS1R<%(XU&RQYRQ+5 (XU&RPP¶QRQ+5-9); Mentes
v. Turkey, App. No. 23186/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 28, 1997); Organisation Mondiale Contre la Torture v. Rwanda,
&RPPXQLFDWLRQV$IU&RPP¶Q+35 ¶¶ 17-18 (Oct. 31, 1996); see also Miguel Vivanco &
Lisa Bhansali, Procedural Shortcomings in the Defense of Human Rights, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 431 (Harris & Livingstone eds., 1998).
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the two²potentially termed ³gross violations´²encompassing situations that seem to approach
situations of crimes against humanity, but may still fall short, due to uncertainty over the extent of
the level of the harm in question.96
Substantial literature has sought to expand the definition of crimes against humanity into
new realms.97 While some such efforts may in fact capture situations that fit the types of harms
enumerated by the Rome Statute, in other cases such attempts appear to have been motivated more
by the fact that the category of crimes against humanity has offered the only legal concept through
which normative condemnation and the possibility of concrete sanction against individuals might
be imagined. Creating new categories of mass harm however will enable further normative pressure
and, in time, may lead to new forms of accountability and jurisdictional avenues for redress, without
overburdening the category of crimes against humanity and at the same time moving away from
some of the more problematic aspects of the criminal context.
VII. CONCLUSION

This paper set out with the purpose of establishing a clearer framework through which
situations of mass or severe rights violation could be conceptualized. In order to engage in that
project, the paper began with the concept of situations of crimes against humanity, and performed
a reconstruction of that concept around the notion of a victim- or harm-centered approach. This
reconstruction was in part normatively motivated, in part intended to produce a simpler notion of
crimes against humanity. While complexities remain, these are the complexities involved in
mapping legal concepts onto complex factual situations, irreducible on any account. The hope is
that a clearer schema will lead to more consistent and assertive invocation of the category of crimes
against humanity, as much in the wider normative context as in the narrower realm of judicial
activity.
The aim, as the last section spelled out, has also been to produce different headings under
96

Such uncertainty may take either factual form (i.e. how extensive are the violations in question in reality?)
or theoretical form (i.e. do the aggregate violations in the situation in question rise to the necessary level of gravity?). In
fact, of course, all investigations will involve uncertainty on both accounts.
97
See, e.g., Ilias Bantekas, Corruption as International Crime and Crime Against Humanity: An Outline of
Supplementary Criminal Justice Policies, 4 J. INT¶L CRIM. JUST. 466 (2006); Emily Camastra, Hazardous Child Labor as a
Crime against Humanity: An Investigation into the Potential Role of the International Criminal Court in Prosecuting
Hazardous Child Labor as Slavery, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL¶Y 335 (2008); Elias Davidson, Economic Oppression
as an International Wrong or as Crime Against Humanity, 23 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 173 (2005); Stuart Ford, Is the Failure
to Respond Appropriately to a Natural Disaster a Crime Against Humanity? The Responsibility to Protect and Individual
Criminal Responsibility in the Aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, 38 DENVER J. INT¶L L & POL¶Y 227 (2010); Neil Francey, The
Death Toll from Tobacco: A Crime Against Humanity?, 8 TOBACCO CONTROL 221 (1999); Jennifer Gong-Gershowitz,
Forced Marriage: A ‘New’ Crime Against Humanity?, 8 NW. J. INT¶L HUM. RTS. 53 (2009); Hyman Greenstein & Paul
DiBianco, Marijuana Laws²A Crime Against Humanity, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 314 (1972); Sonja Grover, The Systematic
Persecution of Street Children as a Crime Against Humanity: Implications for their Right to Asylum, 1 J. MIGRATION &
REFUGEE ISSUES 118 (2006); Neha Jain, Forced Marriage as a Crime Against Humanity: Problems of Definition and
Prosecution, 6 J. INT¶L CRIM. JUST. 1013 (2008); Diana Kearney, Food Deprivations as Crimes Against Humanity, 46
N.Y.U. J. INT¶L L. AND POL. 253 (2013); Ashley McLachlan-Bent & John Langmore, A Crime Against Humanity?
Implications and Prospects of the Responsibility to Protect in the Wake of Cyclone Nargis, 3 GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT
37 (2011); William Tucker, The Big Lie: Is Climate Change Denial a Crime Against Humanity?, 7 INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS.
L. 91 (2012); Mohammed Wattad, The Rome Statute and Captain Planet: What Lies Between ‘Crimes Against Humanity’
and the ‘Natural Environment?¶FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 265 (2009); Judy Yuk & Jessie Yee, Sexual Intercourse as
Rape under the State Policy of Forced Marriage: A Crime Against Humanity, 2 CITY U. HONG KONG L. REV. 161 (2010).
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which mass violations may be classified. The purpose of producing such a schema is twofold. In
the first place, as relative to the reconstruction of the definition of situations of crimes against
humanity, the aim is to utilize the normative power of naming itself, and to utilize the categories
laid out in order to project greater levels of condemnation relative to ongoing situations of violation
in particular. Naming has another function as well however²as readers of Felstiner, Abel, and
Sarat¶s piece will know²naming forms the first stage in a potential process of dispute resolution.
When naming has been accomplished, that is, it is possible to move on to the stage of blaming,
involving the attribution of responsibility to particular actors and the determination of appropriate
sanctions and remedies. By distinguishing the identification of situations of crimes against
humanity from the later criminal liability inquiry, and by distinguishing such situations from other
situations of widespread or systematic human rights violation, it becomes possible to consider other
remedies and penalties that might be appropriate in such instances, in a manner that will
complement the work of criminal proceedings in combatting the worst forms of global rights abuse
globally.
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